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The Decay of  the State
Throughout Nietzsche?s body of work, from On Truth and Lie in the Nonmoral Sense to 
On the Genealogy of Morality, a narrat ive about language and community takes shape. 
Language provides a structure that allows individuals to communicate according to 
shared rules and forms, unit ing them by this standard into a shared community but also 
establishing a hierarchy with respect to the rules and forms of the structure. Eventually, 
Nietzsche argues, this structure becomes associated with the transcendence of religion. 
Democracy, however, brings about ?the decay of the state? by undermining this 
transcendence through the subject ivity and conflict  of democrat ic polit ics.1
This transformation then unfolds in two stages: (1) the privat izat ion of religious 
feeling wrought by democracy, which manifested first  as twentieth-century 
totalitarianism and then as postwar pluralism, and (2) the privat izat ion of state 
funct ions once the first  stage led to sufficient dysfunct ion, which took the form of late 
twentieth-century neoliberalism. Nietzsche is subsequently torn as to the ult imate 
consequences of this privat izat ion of structure. On the one hand, he sees the potent ial 
for self-conscious freedom, as sovereign individuals become masters of their own 
structures. On the other hand, he laments that the absence of structure might bring 
about the re-best ializat ion of man, the end of civil izat ion, and the undoing of human 
consciousness. 
Before understanding Nietzsche?s not ion of the decay of the state, the ideas of the 
state, of the community, and of their sources must be explored. Maurizio Viroli recounts 
the history of polit ical language from the ancient world?s idea of civil philosophy to 
post-Machiavell i theories of reason of state and the subsequent divorce between polit ics 
and what became an individual-centered moral philosophy. He begins with the 
Ciceronian not ion of ?a polit ical man,? who rules ?a community of men bound together 
by principles of just ice? and who ?must possess polit ical virtues.?2 The significance here 
resides in the necessity that a leader possesses virtue and in the idea that polit ics is 
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honorable and the science of just ice. This polit ical thinking becomes more pronounced 
in Plot inus, who says, ?polit ical virtues lead man toward likeness to God because they are 
principles of order and beauty and set bounds and measure to our desires and passions 
[? and] make man?s soul similar to the order and measure of the transcendent world.?3 
Here, Plot inus out lines two important ideas: first , that polit ics brings order and, second, 
that this order resembles the higher order of a transcendent being. St. Augustine 
similarly believed that ?the polit ical community must be well-ordered.?4 Order becomes 
the crucial aim for polit ics, which makes its good pract ice a spiritual act. Viroli then adds 
that, according to Alain de Lil le, polit ical virtues are ?inherently part icularist ic? because 
they pertain to a specific community and its customs.5 An image now emerges of this 
conception of polit ics: a ruler, possessing polit ical virtues? among which ?just ice 
deserves priority? because, according to Baldus of Ubaldis, it  is ?most necessary to rule a 
civitas?? brings a community together under a united sense of just ice and according to 
the specific customs and tradit ions of that community, and this process creates an order 
in the community that brings it  closer to the higher order of transcendent being.6, 7 
Viroli then notes the importance of language in these civil philosophies of polit ics. 
?Latini stresses,? Viroli writes, ?that language is the prerequisite of the city and civil l i fe? 
and that ?Without language there can be no just ice, no friendship, no humane 
community,? because with language do men ?argue about what is just and unjust.?8 
Aristot le and Aquinas emphasize that ?Nature has endowed men with speech, not mere 
voice. Unlike other animals, he can therefore express judgments concerning right and 
wrong.?9 Language, therefore, possesses an integral role not only in polit ics but also to 
any communicat ion between human beings? the phrase human beings (instead of human 
animals) being part icularly relevant here because language allows for connection 
between minds (abstract beings). These ancient and medieval philosophers give language 
a central role in the formation of human communit ies and consciousness. 
Structures l ike language and reason are necessary for the possibil ity of 
intersubject ivity because such human-to-human connection must take place in the space 
of common forms? or non-moral l ies, as Nietzsche would have it . Nietzsche writes, 
?language serves as a bridge between persons? because ?Not to misunderstand each 
other when there is danger: people require this in order to interact with each other. In 
every friendship or relat ionship, people st i l l  put this principle to the test.?10, 11 Two 
communing minds share a language of symbols representing the same or similar images 
and meanings for each, making abstract communicat ion possible. Apart from pure 
physical coercion, these shared symbols are necessary for connections between people. 
As soon as any physical act ion becomes a symbol for conveying an idea, it  ceases being a 
purely physical act and becomes part of a common language. 
Prefiguring his Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche?s early essay On Truth and Lie in the 
Language . . . possesses an integral role not  only  in 
pol i t ics but  also to any communicat ion between 
human beings ?  the phrase human beings being 
part icularly relevant here because language al lows 
for connect ion between minds.
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Nonmoral Sense describes a similar genealogy of language: ?[B]ecause out of both 
necessity and boredom,? he writes, ?he wants to exist socially and in herds, man needs a 
peace treaty and strives at least to rid his world of the crudest forms of bellum omnium 
contra omnes.?12 Man without language lacks any means of connecting to another man 
save for as a physical animal, in which case all interact ions are physical interact ions. 
Violence exists as the only means of conflict  resolut ion, hence the war of all against all. 
Language, as Nietzsche puts it , is the ?peace treaty? that allows for communicat ion 
through its channels so that violence can be avoided and man can live socially, but this 
innovation comes with the caveat that ??truth? is now fixed, that is, a uniformly valid and 
binding designation of things is invented, and the legislat ion of language likewise yields 
the first  laws of truth.?13 Once language arises as the medium for non-physical 
intersubject ivity, an edifice arises through which men must interface to interact with 
each other. 
Thus, language, whether spoken or writ ten words, logical symbols, or mathematical 
postulates, requires an imposit ion. In the case of a conversat ion, each individual 
self- imposes the common forms necessary for communicat ion. The individual compels 
himself to associate a symbol with an image and meaning in his mind, and the other 
individual does likewise, so that both experience a common sensation with respect to the 
shared symbol. ?As a rat ional being,? Nietzsche writes, man ?now submits his act ions to 
the rule of abstract ions.?14 To be rat ional at all is to submit to the abstract laws of 
rat ionality. This process establishes a common structure necessary for intersubject ivity, 
which is, significant ly, hierarchical and imposed. If the common space of connection is 
language, then it  is subject to the rules of grammar, syntax, vocabulary, spell ing, and so 
on. The individual must subject himself to these external rules in order to communicate 
to another individual, and this second individual must do likewise. The result , as 
Nietzsche puts it , is ?the construct ion of a pyramidal order of castes and degrees, 
creat ing a new world of laws, privileges, subordinates, and boundary demarcations . . . 
something regulatory and imperat ive.?15 This structure of rules, then, establishes 
rect itude of form depending on an expression?s proximity to or distance from the rules of 
that structure. The greater the proximity, the more accurate and understandable are the 
shared forms and, therefore, the better related are the individual?s ideas. A hierarchy of 
expression then arises based on the common standard of the shared structure, and at the 
center of this structure are the common rules: grammar, postulates, or presupposit ions, 
for example. To veer from these rules is to express oneself inferiorly and vice versa. In the 
case of conversat ion, the rules are imposed only insofar as every individual must impose 
adherence on himself if he desires to be understood and part icipate in discourse and 
connection with other humans. 
This ent ire process is concisely summarized by anthropologist Stephen A. Tyler: 
Our subject ivity, then, requires a world of external convention which it  supposes 
is object ive but whose object ivity is, in fact, a consequence of intersubject ivity. 
The poles of our understanding? its subject ivity and object ivity, immanence and 
transcendence? derive from that intersubject ivity manifest in the first  act of 
genuine speech.16 
Intersubject ivity requires and then creates a common structure, but which then becomes 
seemingly object ive and, eventually, transcendent. ?[E]very word becomes a concept,? 
Nietzsche writes; over t ime, men confuse the forms of his making with the things 
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themselves.17 The structure, in other words, becomes the truth? transcendent and 
universal. 
The necessity of such a hierarchical and imposed structure for human connection 
becomes more pronounced in the case of bringing together a community. A community 
has part icular customs and tradit ions, and the ruler uses these forms to establish rules 
that allow the community to form a unity through common subject ion to them, creat ing 
a part icularist ic order. The name for this collect ion of the community?s rules is just ice. 
Unlike the mere conversat ional version of this dynamic, wherein individuals impose 
shared rules upon themselves in order communicate to one another, in polit ics, the ruler 
imposes the common rules. The dynamic has not changed; only its manifestat ion has. In 
the l inguist ic case, imposit ion adheres to a common structure, but inst itutes of language 
do not violent ly impose their rule upon dissident writers; rather, dissidents are 
ostracized by the community for fail ing to conform, or they are ignored because their 
refusal to conform makes them difficult  to understand. Polit ics, however, because it  
pertains not only to rules of communicat ion but also to rules of behavior, must confront 
behavior on the behavioral plane: act ion. The ruler? aptly named because he personifies 
the rules? becoming? uses force to impose the order necessary not only for the efficiency 
or just ice of the community, but for the community to exist at all. The community, in 
other words, does not pre-exist and then require an imposit ion of just ice; the imposit ion 
of just ice creates the community, and the ruler is the actor who does so. But, l ike the 
false object ivity that arises from the rules that allow for intersubject ivity, the rules of the 
community, bound together in the conception of just ice, over t ime take on the 
characterist ic of transcendence. Thus, Plot inus and St. Augustine see in polit ical order a 
relatedness to a higher, divine order. 
What Viroli subsequently recounts as the transit ion from civil philosophy to reason 
of state (polit ical science in the Machiavell ian tradit ion) is the history of the ascent of an 
error? that error being a false divorce between private morality and public polit ical 
just ice. According to Batista Guarini, ?Since polit ics is the architectural discipline par 
excellence, it  must be regarded as superior to rhetoric.?18 But this statement does not 
fully take into account the interdependence of polit ics and rhetoric. As noted above, the 
origin of the community is language because it  serves as the first  common standard by 
which the community unites according to shared rules. The ruler has to bring an order to 
the community rooted in its customs, and what could be a more prime custom than 
language itself? The ruler, therefore, has to contend with the common structures already 
present by virtue of language, and thus, has to use rhetoric in the pract ice of polit ics. 
Power relies on rhetoric and language, which empowers a part icular form of language; 
the two are, thus, inexorably intertwined in a process of just ice becoming. The ruler 
imposes just ice, common rules shared by the community, but his very ascent depends on 
his ut i l izat ion of the common rules of language and rhetoric. 
Post-Machiavell ian polit ical science correct ly holds that ?What really counts is 
pract ice (?uso?), rather than knowledge of any universal rules,? because the apparently 
universal rules actually derive from the pract ice of polit ics.19 But this conception is 
mistaken in determining that ?Once identified with the art  of preserving a man or 
group?s power, polit ics was no longer regarded as the noblest of all pract ical sciences,? 
and when Lott ini writes that ?the prince must not hesitate to resort also to the rules of 
the art  of the state, no matter if they are repugnant to the principles of just ice.?20, 21 This 
thinking establishes a false dichotomy between just ice and the supposedly ajust pract ice 
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of polit ics, whose goal is the preservat ion of the power of the state because the pract ice 
of polit ics creates the order that allows for just ice in the first  place. A ruler cannot violate 
the rules of just ice if his doing so preserves his power and, therefore, the power of the 
state to maintain the order that makes just ice possible. Violat ions of just ice on the part 
of the ruler are paradoxical because they are ult imately act ions in the service of 
establishing just ice. Bernardo Segni makes this false dist inct ion when he argues that 
subjects ?no longer had the opportunity to part icipate in polit ical l i fe,? and rulers ?just 
needed the art  of the state.?22 He overlooks the fact that subjects st i l l  part icipate in 
polit ical l i fe insofar as their membership in the community depends upon their 
adherence to common rules, which are enforced by the ruler, integrat ing ruler and ruled 
into a unified polit ical l i fe, not separat ing them into a private sphere and reason of state. 
Viroli notes that the product of this evolut ion from civil philosophy to reason of state 
carried with it  the not ion of a ?new polit ical man,? who ?is not supposed to rule for the 
good of his subjects, but for his own.?23 But in pursuing his own good, a ruler must 
necessarily take into account the good of his subjects, lest his cruelty ult imately bring 
about his own demise. Hence the not ion of good measure, present in both civil 
philosophy? John of Viterbo?s advice that ?rulers must always maintain the right 
measure, according to the t ime and the circumstances, without exceeding the 
appropriate terms?? and in the idea of reason of state? Cosimo de? Medici?s pract ice 
wherein ?the prince . . . should use a severe just ice (?severa giustitia?) with culprits, and 
clemency with the rest.?24, 25 The fundaments of civil philosophy remain in one way or 
another in the theory of reason of state, but the latter falsely divides polit ics and just ice 
and is, therefore, a confusion and not a genuine transformation. 
Benedict Anderson likewise notes the importance of language and transcendence in 
creat ing communit ies. He writes, ?All the great classical communit ies conceived of 
themselves as cosmically central, through the medium of a sacred language linked to a 
superterrestrial order of power.?26 Here again a language-based order derives from power 
and takes on the characterist ic of transcendence. ?[O]ntological reality,? he adds, ?is 
apprehensible only through a single, privileged system of re-presentat ion: the 
truth-language.?27 Language brings the community together through its shared forms, 
relaying a common notion of truth, but this process depends upon the power of the 
privileged system, as he calls it . Power and its imposed forms are, then, necessary to the 
existence of the community. Anderson here echoes the thinking of the civil philosophy 
out lined in Viroli. ?The fundamental conceptions about ?social group,?? Anderson writes, 
?were centripetal and hierarchical, rather than boundary-oriented and horizontal? with 
?Kingship organiz[ing] everything around a high centre.?28, 29 Anderson contrasts this 
hierarchical power structure with the later idea of the nat ion, ?imagined as a community, 
because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitat ion that may prevail in each, the 
nat ion is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.?30 
But, as noted above, horizontal community requires the vert ical structure of an 
imposed higher standard in order for the community to possess a unified form. Anderson 
is then correct in saying that the nat ion is ?imagined,? and in disagreeing with Gellner?s 
content ion that this imagining is ?fabricat ion? rather than ?creation,? but he does not 
fully recognize the necessity of vert ical structure for the existence of the nat ion?s 
horizontal community.31 Nations, therefore, are not different from classical, 
sacred-language-based civil izat ions in their underlying structure but only in scope and 
manifestat ion. The community is imaged as a territorially-demarcated community of 
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peers, but st i l l  requires a vert ical power structure to impose the common language, now 
including nat ional myths, fest ivals, events, and so on, so that the community can exist at 
all. This process of imposit ion does not mean that the ent ire nat ion is nothing but a 
cynical imposit ion by and for power. As recognized by the civil philosophers, power must 
contend with exist ing customs. Tradit ions, myths, and the like naturally arise, and power 
standardizes these forms into a higher standard, shaping a community into existence. In 
Nietzschean parlance, the nat ion becomes what it  is. He describes the relat ionship 
between language and community: 
Using the same words is not enough to get people to understand each other: they 
have to use the same words for the same species of inner experiences . . . This is 
why a people in a community wil l understand each other better than they 
understand people belonging to other groups, even when they all use the same 
language. Or rather, when individuals have lived together for a long t ime under 
similar condit ions  . . . , there arises something that ?understands itself?? a 
people.32 
Language?s vert ical structure contains forms that generate the same sensation in 
different individuals so that these individuals can interface through this structure and 
convey meanings to each other. A community then arises from the language, consist ing 
of the collect ion of individuals whom the forms of that part icular language affect by 
rousing in them the same sensations. This community of self-understanding is what 
Nietzsche calls ?a people,? the origin of ?the nat ion,? i l lustrat ing the need for a vert ical 
structure (language) for the existence of a horizontal community (the people). 
The same process by which language creates a people also gives rise to language 
itself: communicat ive symbols naturally arise, but over t ime authorit ies standardize 
these symbols into a higher standard: formal language. Language is never nefariously 
invented by the machinat ions of power; the standardizat ion of formal language takes 
what arose organically and then clarifies common rules. Even the not ion of self requires a 
similar process: a component of consciousness has to impose a standard on the totality 
of impulses, desires, and act ions to separate the who-I-am from the who-I-am-not. 
Nietzsche touches upon this process in the Genealogy, specifically in describing how the 
not ion of the ?subject? itself is born. The slaves of his master-slave dichotomy invent the 
not ion of the ?subject? so that the act ions of the masters become freely wil led ?deeds,? 
which allows the slaves to hold the masters responsible.33 Ult imately, however, the slaves 
themselves are subjected to this standard. The very process through which the slaves 
invent the ?subject? is that by which they become subjects themselves and, then, become 
subjected to a seemingly external standard, which subsequently, as noted above, takes on 
the characterist ic of transcendence. This process is not only the genealogy of morality 
but also the genealogy of language and the state. Like the latter two, the concept of the 
?subject? init ially arises organically: the need to believe ?in an unbiased ?subject? with 
freedom of choice? arises from ?an inst inct of self-preservat ion? and facil itates ?that 
sublime self-deception? of ?the majority of the dying, the weak and the oppressed.?34 
Like language, the concept of the ?subject? arises to serve an evolut ionary need, and from 
this, a power? in this case, the rat ional faculty? erects a standard that defines the 
parameters of the self. In this case, the standard not only l imits the scope of act ion or 
expression but also the scope of the self, defining it  as the ?subject,? or the freely wil l ing 
agent and, therefore, excluding inst incts, compulsions, and the ent ire physical presence 
from selfhood. Thus, accidents are not products of the self. 
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Nietzsche also notes how this creat ion of the self is not independently created but 
intertwined in its formation with the community. ?[C]onscious thinking,? he says*, ?takes 
place in words, that is, in communication symbols; and this fact discloses the origin of 
consciousness.?35 Nietzsche places the origin of consciousness in language and the 
origin of rat ional man in submission to abstract concepts, which themselves derive from 
language. Because language arises for the purpose of social l iving, the self arises in the 
realm of intersubject ivity, not independently or internally. Nietzsche writes, therefore, 
?consciousness actually belongs not to man?s existence as an individual but rather to the 
community and herd-aspects of his nature.?36 Through social interact ion with others 
does the vert ical structure of intersubject ivity arise (language, reason, etc.), and through 
these forms, rat ional consciousness comes into being and defines a not ion of self in 
relat ion and opposit ion to the common framework, creat ing the not ion of the ?internal,? 
despite this internality relying on the structures of communal intersubject ivity. Without 
socializat ion, there would be no self, at least in the human sense of a thinking mind. 
Nietzsche describes how the self arises through the ?breeding [of ] an animal with the 
prerogative to promise? and makes ?man to a certain degree necessary, uniform, a peer 
amongst peers, orderly and consequently predictable.?37 The unnatural, constant self 
arises out of the natural process of breeding, again i l lustrat ing the process by which the 
vert ical structure that defines a thing arises from an evolut ionary process rooted in the 
substance that the vert ical structure comes to shape through its imposit ion of rule? the 
thing becoming itself. This process is similar to Benedict Anderson?s descript ion of the 
origin of the nat ional idea: ?The idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically 
through homogenous, empty t ime is a precise analogue of the idea of the nat ion, . . . solid 
community moving steadily down (or up) history.?38 The use of the word ?organism? 
emphasizes the comparison. The nation comes into being like the self and like all things. 
The nat ion-state, therefore, cannot be separated into the nat ion (the people) and the 
state (the structures governing those people) because the imposit ion of a state?s 
authority creates a nat ional idea among the populat ion who share the common 
structures of its rule, and the beginning of a nat ional idea creates a wil l- to-state, an 
authority to formalize the structures that const itute the nat ion. The state does not create 
the people out of nothing, but the people as such do not pre-exist the authority that 
creates them. For example and more at home for Nietzsche, the conception of the 
German nation simultaneously gave birth to an idea of Germanness and, therefore, to a 
standard by which something was German or not. And so, because a standard by its 
nature requires an authority to establish and impose it , the birth of the will to a German 
nation was also the birth of the idea of the German state, the vert ical structure that 
would bring into being the horizontal community of the nat ion. Things, therefore, do not 
exist to be subsequently subjected; things become through subject ion? quite l iterally, 
the creat ion of the subject. 
The self, language, the state, and religion all share the same underlying process of 
becoming. Nietzsche contends that ?instruct ions from above? are the concept in which 
?divine and human government are usually fused.?39 ?The power,? he adds*, ?that l ies in 
unity of popular sentiment, in the fact that everyone holds the same opinions and has 
Without social izat ion, there would be no self, at  
least  in the human sense of a thinking mind.
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the same object ive, is sealed and protected by religion.?40 The power of a vert ical 
structure is strengthened and safeguarded by the transcendence of religion? whether the 
Catholic church of medieval Christendom or the German myth and folklore revitalized by 
nineteenth century German nationalism? but this power relat ionship is precisely what is 
undone by democracy. Nietzsche argues that in democracy, government ?is regarded as 
nothing but the instrument of the popular wil l, not as an Above in relat ion to a Below but 
merely as a funct ion of the sole sovereign power, the people.?41 With respect to the 
nineteenth century nat ion-state, the transformation of the vert ical structure (the state) 
into popular sovereignty means also the disintegrat ion of the nat ional community to 
which it  gives form. In other words, ?the sovereignty of the people serves then to banish 
the last remnant of magic and superst it ion from this realm of feeling,? bringing about 
the ?decay of the state.?42 This decay has two stages, which Nietzsche proceeds to 
describe. 
The first  stage grows out of the privat izat ion of religion, which takes away 
transcendent legit imacy from the state and poses the first  crisis. ?The first  consequence 
of this,? Nietzsche writes, ?will be an apparent strengthening of religious feeling.?43 
Nietzsche, notably, does not l imit  this phenomenon to religion proper but speaks more 
broadly of religious feeling, by which he means the privat izat ion of the moral component 
of the state. As discussed above, the state brings just ice into being through its imposit ion 
of the rules of just ice. With the privat izat ion of the religious feeling, transcendent 
conceptions of just ice also become private and, eventually take the form of ideologies. 
These ideologies become vert ical structures of their own, forming and shaping new 
horizontal groups that stand outside of and in opposit ion to the state. The tenets of 
these ideologies wil l arise organically l ike those of the state-community that they grow 
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to oppose. The necessit ies or interests of groups (a social class, etc.) are standardized 
into group ideologies that then establish what ought to be the characterist ics and 
interests of its respect ive group. Thus, just as with the polit ical community, with 
language, and with the self, these ideologies become what they are. 
These ideologies? opposit ion to the state wil l arouse ?an almost fanatical enthusiasm 
for the state . . . aided by the fact that, since their sundering from religion, hearts in these 
circles have felt  a sense of emptiness, which they are seeking provisionally to fi l l  with a 
kind of subst itute in the form of devotion to the state.?44 In effect, the state becomes its 
own ideology, arising from its need to preserve itself in the face of the new ideological 
competit ion. In other words, the state becomes increasingly authoritarian and develops 
its own pro-state ideology. The anti-state ideologies become increasingly violent against 
the state because violence was rendered unjust by virtue of the common just ice of the 
state. But the disintegrat ion of the commonality of that just ice wrought by the decay of 
the state means that there is no longer a shared standard of just ice between the different 
ideologies and between the ideologies and the state. In fact, violence becomes just within 
the context of the ideology because it  allows that ideology?s conception of the right 
(just ice) to come to power. Such a society wil l cease to be a unified community, lacking 
any shared core. 
This first  phase of Nietzsche?s predict ion unfolded in first  half of the twentieth 
century. The transcendent power of the state dissipated and the two ideologies that 
defined the era, Communism and National Socialism, were totalitarian. Vert ical 
structures l imit  everything except themselves. Within the state model, ideologies are 
l imited by the supremacy of the state, but the state is only l imited by itself. In other 
words, the state is only l imited by its structure? separat ion of powers, elect ions, 
parliamentary coalit ion building, and so forth. A vert ical structure can only be limited by 
the internal form of that structure. Because the new anti-state ideologies comprise their 
own vert ical structures, they are not l imited by the tradit ional rules of the state and are, 
therefore, totalitarian in their scope and act ivity. The state must then alter its structure 
to combat ideologies not l imited by the norms of its own vert ical structure, leading to the 
increasing centralizat ion of power and authoritarianism of states in the early twentieth 
century in attempt to preserve order amid increasing polit ical violence, and culminating 
in Fascism, the unfettered power of the state as such over society, without external 
ideological just ificat ion from class (Communism) or race (National Socialism). 
Hannah Arendt different iates between the totalitarian movements and Italian 
Fascism, wherein Mussolini ?did not attempt to establish a full- fledged totalitarian 
regime and contented himself with dictatorship and one-party rule,? similar to 
?nontotalitarian dictatorships . . . in prewar Rumania, Poland, the Balt ic states, Hungary, 
Portugal and Franco Spain.?45 In totalitarian movements, the vert ical structures? power 
In effect, the state becomes its own ideology, arising 
from its need to preserve itself in the face of the new 
ideological competit ion. In other words, the state 
becomes increasingly authoritarian and develops its 
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became unlimited because their only l imitat ions, those of the structures? own internal 
contradict ions, were eliminated by centralizing power in the hands of a single 
individual? the party leader or the Führer. The individual became the vert ical structure 
so that the power of each ideology could be maximized in content ion with the others. 
The state responded with the fascist dictator, who, as i l lustrated by Mussolini?s eventual 
oust ing, did not possess the total power of his Communist or National Socialist  
equivalents. The fascist, being the defender of the state, was st i l l  l imited by the internal 
structural l imitat ions that define the state. The fascist state was authoritarian with 
respect to the tradit ional roles of the state? law and order, polit ical dissidents, and so 
on? but had much less interest in regulat ing the minutiae of day to day life. By contrast, 
when the continuity of the German state was threatened in the latter days of the Second 
World War, National Socialist  ideology took precedent even if it  forced the state to act 
self-destruct ively. When the fascist state was threatened, the Italian government 
removed Mussolini to preserve the inst itut ions and funct ions of the state. In this respect, 
the failure of the assassinat ion attempt on Adolf Hit ler in July 1944 was the defeat of a 
fascist ic tendency within the German state. 
Nothing stood in the way of the force and imposit ion of the vert ical structure of the 
totalitarian movement over society and beyond society through war, which inevitably 
followed its ascendance to power. Arendt notes that totalitarian ideologies seek to 
?encompass, in due course, the ent ire human race? because they grew out of 
nineteenth-century ?pan-movements,? which possessed a ?[h]ost i l i ty to the state as an 
inst itut ion.?46, 47 Totalitarian ideologies were, therefore, the ant i-state ideologies that 
resulted from the privat izat ion of the ?religious feeling,? or private claims to moral 
certainty; Mussolini and the other state-dictatorships to which Arendt refers exemplify 
?fanatical enthusiasm for the state.?48 The rise of totalitarianism in the first  half of the 
twentieth century brought to fruit ion the first  part of Nietzsche?s predict ion. 
In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Jürgen Habermas describes a 
process of privat izat ion that took place in the late eighteenth century, but this was the 
beginning and not the totality of the privat izing process that Nietzsche describes. 
Habermas writes, ?To the degree that they [commodity owners] were emancipated from 
governmental direct ives and controls, they made decisions freely in accord with 
standards of profitabil ity.?49 These owners ?were subject only to the anonymous laws 
funct ioning in accord with an economic rat ionality immanent, so it  appeared, in the 
market,? laws ?backed up by the ideological guarantee of a not ion that market exchange 
was just,? enabling ?just ice to triumph over force.?50 The ?autonomy of private people? 
was based on ?the right to property.?51 This does mark a transformation of the public 
sphere, to use his t it le, from civic-minded eighteenth century republicanism to private 
nineteenth century capitalism, but the latter st i l l  relies on a single, imposed vert ical 
structure? the bourgeois state. Habermas says the transit ion marked what was perceived 
as the ascendance of just ice over force, but this conception of just ice was a specifically 
property-based, capitalist  conception of just ice that, ult imately, had to be enforced 
through the power of the state. Beneath the right to property must l ie the enforcement of 
that right, and so the transformation was less a complete privat izat ion than it  was a shift  
in focus within the public sphere from civic l ife to private l ife. This new private sphere 
st i l l  required the public authority of the state and common ideology to enshrine it . 
Habermas makes this clear in writ ing that what ?completed the privat izat ion of civil 
society? was ?a market that? made ?possible a matter of private people left  to 
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themselves.?52 But, l ike the self, whose existence as a rat ional consciousness depends 
upon the shared linguist ic and abstract structure of the community, this private person 
depended upon the public just ice structure of the market for the autonomy of their 
private l ife. This nineteenth century private man only possessed his ?libert ies? because 
they were ?codified in the system of bourgeois civil law, [which] protected the order of 
the ?free market.??53 The new private sphere depended upon the market, which in turn 
depended upon the law, and this law had to be enforced by the state, the public authority 
and, l ike it  had always been, the protector of the community?s vert ical structure, a 
property-based, capitalist  structure in this case. Thus, the thinking of the t ime that the 
private sphere was ?free from domination? and ?free from any kind of coercion? was 
mistaken.54 In fact, the private sphere required domination by a private-property law 
system and the coercion necessary to enforce that system. Without those elements, the 
commerce and free trade that made the private sphere possible could not exist. The 
supposed aim of ?abolishing the state as an instrument of domination altogether? was in 
fact only the aim of abolishing the domination of state act ion contrary to the market 
while enshrining state act ion that defended the market? enforcing property law, 
contracts, and so on.55 
Precisely this domination of capitalist  interests passing themselves off as 
object ive? having replaced the previous era?s domination of feudal interests passing 
themselves off as transcendent? drove Marx?s desire to st ir the proletariat into a 
consciousness of opposit ion between proletarian interests and those of the bourgeoisie. 
This thinking marks the more profound privat izat ion that culminated in the twentieth 
century, Marxist thought having developed into one of the two totalitarian ideologies 
described above. The dist inct ion is that Habermas? nineteenth-century privat izat ion st i l l  
depended upon a central vert ical structure upon which the ent ire community was based 
and which the state enforced. The vert ical structure had lost the overt ly religious 
just ificat ion of the pre-Enlightenment era, but st i l l  existed as the sole, and therefore 
seemingly object ive and external, authority. Marx, because he recognized the 
un-object ive and interest-minded nature of that system, recognized an opposit ion of 
interests between bourgeoisie and proletariat and, therefore, labeled proletariat support 
for bourgeois social inst itut ions false consciousness. Marxist ideology became its own 
vert ical structure that stood in opposit ion to the prevail ing bourgeois vert ical structure 
and, therefore, in opposit ion to the state. This was the beginning of the privat izat ion of 
?religious feeling? wherein Nietzsche saw the decay of the state and which eventually led 
to the disintegrat ion of the tradit ional state in the twentieth century in the face of the 
totalitarian movements? the privat izat ion of the conception of right, from public just ice 
to ideology.56 
The latter privat izat ion is more reminiscent of Hegel?s recounting the demise of 
ethical l i fe under the ?Roman Realm.?57 He describes how ?different iat ion is carried to its 
conclusion, and ethical l i fe is sundered without end into the extremes of the private 
self-consciousness of persons on the one hand, and abstract universality on the other,? 
this universality being that of ?private persons equal with one another? and pursuing 
?insat iable self-wil l.?58 Ethical l i fe is torn apart into each individual?s interest, which 
could be idealist ic or hedonist ic but is ult imately only the will of a single individual set 
against all others. The only universal is that every individual possesses a wil l of his own 
and so pursues it . Those in power eventually seek only ?the maintenance of heart less 
self-seeking power? while the democrat ic element ?becomes more and more corrupt 
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until it  sinks into a rabble.?59 Each individual becomes his own vert ical structure, in a 
sense, and lacking the communal medium of intersubject ivity and social l i fe, individuals 
become both solipsist ic and yet empathically aware of every other individual?s solipsist ic 
l ife? ?universal misfortune.?60 Rome would ult imately see the consequence of this 
transformation in the renewed barbarism of its later years and eventual dissolut ion. 
The second part of the Nietzsche?s predict ion occurred over the course of the second 
half of the twentieth century and continues today in this century. After the destruct ion 
wrought by totalitarianism in the 1930s and 40s, the taste for violence waned, but the 
fundamental nature of polit ics remained. In fact, the not ion of various vert ical structures 
contending for power has become the central idea of postwar pluralism. These vert ical 
structures, however, no longer seek total domination because doing so would risk the 
total destruct ion of the ideology. Ideologies st i l l  compete for power but have replaced 
street fights, paramilitaries, and polit ical violence with campaigns, elect ions, public 
relat ions strategies, and act ivist  organizat ions. This mixture of a democrat ic batt lefield 
with an underlying pluralism of vert ical structures gave rise to pluralist  democracy. But, 
over the last several decades, this arrangement has had Nietzsche?s predicted effects. 
?The individual,? Nietzsche argues*, ?will see only that side of it  [the state] that promises 
to be useful or threatens to be harmful to him, and will bend all his efforts to acquiring 
influence upon it .?61 The state becomes the means to pursue one?s personal interests, 
and the goal of polit ics becomes simply the contest for the reins of the state. 
The persistence of the underlying essence of polit ics present in the totalitarian age is 
i l lustrated by Nietzsche?s descript ion of individuals? relat ionship to the law: ?bowing for 
the moment to the force which backs up the law,? but then sett ing ?to work to subvert it  
with a new force, the creat ion of a new majority.?62 Laws are no longer the 
semi-transcendent rules of the state?s vert ical structure; instead, they have become only 
the surface tools in the service of one?s own vert ical structure, whether a party, ideology, 
or personal interest. Laws are to be tolerated only insofar as violat ions carry negative 
consequences, but are then to be steered through democrat ic polit ics and majority 
building in a favorable direct ion. The underlying elements of the totalitarian age persist 
in that laws and the state have lost their transcendent centrality, and that polit ics is a 
contest between differing vert ical structures, but democracy has replaced violence and 
war. In addit ion, even ideological transcendence has dissipated and given way to 
personal interest. As a result , vert ical structures themselves have become more fluid as 
rigid ideologies have given way to shift ing public opinion, rising and fall ing polit ical 
part ies, and changing governing coalit ions. Eventually, ?the uselessness and 
destruct iveness of these short-winded struggles wil l impel man to . . . the resolve to do 
away with the concept of the state, to the abolit ion of the dist inct ion between private 
and public.?63 
The underlying elements of the total i tarian age 
persist  in that  laws and the state have lost  their 
t ranscendent central i ty, and that  pol i t ics is a 
contest  between differing vert ical structures, but  
democracy has replaced violence and war.
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Nietzsche here portends the rise of neoliberalism in the last decades of the twentieth 
century and its pursuit  of privat izat ion. The World Health Organizat ion defines 
neoliberalism as ?a belief in the free market and minimum barriers to the flow of goods, 
services and capital,? consist ing of four primary tenets: ?capital account l iberalizat ion, 
trade liberalizat ion, domestic l iberalizat ion, and privat izat ion.?64 In Capital Resurgent, 
Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy describe neoliberalism as abandoning ?state 
intervention in industrial policy? in favor of ??market? rules.?65 Foreseeing this 
transformation, Nietzsche predicts that ?Private companies wil l step by step absorb the 
business of the state: even the most resistant remainder of what was formerly the work 
of government . . . wil l in the long run be taken care of by private contractors.?66 In short, 
the privat izat ion of vert ical structure that democracy engenders eventually makes 
democracy itself dysfunct ional. The state becomes just the avenue for competit ion 
between groups and individuals, who are no longer bound together by any higher sense 
of community. Neoliberalism transfers the structural authority that a pluralist , 
democrat ic state can no longer possess to private inst itut ions. Market rules or economic 
laws become the objective standard of the neoliberal vert ical structure. Neoliberal 
privat izat ion, in other words, represents the formation of a new vert ical structure outside 
the competit ion of democrat ic pluralism, result ing in a non-part icipatory authority that 
resembles the state of the pre-democrat ic era, although private inst itut ions st i l l  have to 
contend (at least for now) with the democrat ic state and its polit ical fluctuat ions. 
Underlying any community, any relat ion between individuals, and even the not ion of 
the self, are vert ical structures, which establish rules and define that community, 
relat ion, or self. But precisely what Nietzsche recognizes both with the death of God and 
the decay of the state is the loss of belief in the transcendence of those vert ical 
structures. Morality is no longer divine, the state is no longer absolute, and, by the 
twentieth century, even the self had been deconstructed by psychoanalysis. What, then, 
were and will be the consequences of this transformation in human consciousness? Keith 
Ansell-Pearson sees in this dilemma a similarity between Nietzsche and Rousseau but 
also two ?very different solut ions.?67 Both see ?social inst itut ions? as a problem, but 
Rousseau sees them as standing ?in the way of cult ivat ing our true moral nature,? while 
Nietzsche holds that ?the problem lies with morality itself, which stands in the way of 
the further advancement and cult ivat ion of the human animal.?68 Nietzsche, in essence, 
takes Rousseau?s argument to its ult imate conclusion. Rousseau posits a type of man who 
had been corrupted by society?s vert ical structures and, through their rules and 
imposit ion, alienated from his natural being, which, in Rousseau?s mind, was moral. 
Nietzsche recognizes morality itself as a constrict ing vert ical structure and, 
therefore, Rousseau?s man of the state of nature as a contradict ion. Man before the 
existence of any vert ical structures was completely animal. According to Ansell-Pearson, 
Nietzsche saw this state in ?the Dionysian experience,? which ?symbolizes precisely that 
oneness with nature yearned for by Rousseau,? the ?overcoming of the subject? and ?a 
feeling of ?mystical self-abnegation,?? which reveals man as a ?species-being.?69 There is 
oneness because without any vert ical structure, there is no process of self-creat ion and 
individuation; everything exists as one natural being. But the pre-structure Dionysian 
was not an overcoming of the subject because the subject had not yet been constructed. 
Rousseau clings to civil ized inst itut ions and art ificially places them in nature by seeing 
the ?genuine liberty? of man?s redemption as arising for the individual ?only as a 
member of a social community in which one becomes a unique moral person.?70 But both 
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the community and the unique, individuated person rely on structures that alienate man 
from Rousseau?s desired ?state of ?universal Sameness.??71 This explains Nietzsche?s 
belief that the Dionysian contains a ?host il i ty to the polit ical inst inct?? the very nature 
of polit ics is the pursuit  and construct ion of the rules and inst itut ions that divorce man 
from nature.72 
After man?s alienation l ies the potent ial and need for self-overcoming. And, 
important ly, the goal is an overcoming, not an undoing. Nietzsche does not desire the 
destruct ion of all form and structure, but the consciousness of that form and structure 
and the process by which it  was formed and has developed. ?Nietzsche,? Ansell-Pearson 
asserts*, ?does not call for a return to nature, for ?there has never been a natural 
humanity? man reaches nature only after a long struggle.??73 Man cannot self-overcome 
by destroying the very conscious human facult ies that allow for self-overcoming; he 
overcomes himself by gaining consciousness of himself, his evolut ion, the social 
inst itut ions around him, and their evolut ion. This consciousness affords man a certain 
power over these not ions and himself. He cannot remove himself from these structures 
without, in a sense, ceasing to be human; he can only direct them. The focus becomes 
?architectonic, polit ical sculpture? in that man builds for himself, using his 
consciousness of what he was previously subjected to, ?an aesthet ic meaning . . . based 
on the creat ive entwinement of good and evil.?74 Man should not destroy structure but 
shape it  in his striving for an aesthet ic of his own envisioning. Man should not return to 
Dionysian oneness but act with an awareness of that oneness on his Apollonian 
consciousness and its products. 
The question remains, then: what consequence does this historic transformation in 
consciousness have for Europe? Stefan Elbe argues that European man?s will- to-truth 
brings about the knowledge of the evolut ion and history of the will- to-truth, confront ing 
him with the fact that the will- to-truth does not provide for the value of truth. After this 
realizat ion, ?The highest European value,? for what Nietzsche terms good Europeans, 
?would gradually shift  from being truth, to being freedom.?75 But by this, Nietzsche does 
not mean some definite collect ion of freedoms, arising from polit ical l iberalism or a 
doctrinal not ion of human rights. Instead, he refers to the freedom arising from man?s 
newfound consciousness of the vert ical structures he has overcome, including those of 
the self, ideology, the state, and religion. 
The destruct ion of vert ical structures would not result  in freedom but in a chaotic 
fluidity of vert ical structure, where any vert icality would be only a temporary and 
inst inct-driven coagulat ion by the mob. Such change would represent a regression into 
animality, not self-overcoming. Rather, through consciousness of and then the shaping of 
these structures does man gain a creative freedom. The sovereign individual is not 
supposed to destroy the ?Roman columbarium? of man?s knowledge; he is supposed to 
understand that man built  it , so that he can build consciously.76 Elbe warns specifically 
against ?art iculat ing an overarching idea of Europe with fixed attributes,? ?the 
temptat ion of drawing up an ideal or identity that Europeans would then be persuaded to 
internalize,? and erect ing ?new idols.?77 Signs of this creat ively free new Europe existed 
at various points in the twentieth century, from modernist art  to existent ialist  and 
absurdist l i terature to the avant-garde cinema of the 1960s: Europe not as an ent ity 
defined by some external standard but as self-defining creat ivity free from ?the empty 
and life-denying aspects of the prior Christ ian-Platonic standards,? afforded ?the 
historic opportunity to experiment with an existence liberated from the constraints of 
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such past ideals.?78, 79 A Europe will ing to explore moral ambiguity art ist ically, in 
l iterature and fi lm, whether realist ically, darkly comic, or even through aesthet ic camp, 
which seems, through its self-conscious ridiculousness, to have embraced a cosmic 
meaninglessness. 
But would a Europe of sovereign individuals, each consciously building his own 
vert ical structure and climbing it  in his own way, be any different from the universal 
solipsism and empathy thereof described by Hegel as the condit ion of late Rome? If each 
man were the architect of his own world, wouldn?t the very intersubject ive nature of 
structure have been lost? Perhaps this dilemma explains why Nietzsche clung to an 
aristocrat ic elit ism, wherein resides a taste of Plato?s philosopher-king, but a 
philosopher-king who doesn?t know the form of the good, but creates it ; an aristocracy 
that would freely and consciously erect a new structure for Europe, which would then 
subsume the masses. Both Nietzsche and Plato, it  seems, came at a t ime in their 
respect ive civil izat ions when the consciousness existed to conceive of a new kind of 
civil izat ion that had never before existed, but only briefly enough to glimpse the dream 
before the world around them descended into the renewed barbarism of late 
civil izat ion? a barbarism that arises not from animal unconsciousness, but from 
pervasive self-consciousness. 
Perhaps, then, the utopian visions of the twentieth century? not systems 
unconsciously submitted to but ideas consciously conceived as new 
ideologies? were Europe?s Republics. Perhaps the whole of humanity is no more 
than a stage in the evolut ion of a certain species of animal of l imited durat ion: 
so that the human being has emerged from the ape, and will return to the ape, 
while there wil l be no one present to take any sort of interest in this strange 
comic conclusion. Just as, with the decline of Roman culture and its principal 
cause, the spread of Christ ianity, a general uglificat ion of man prevailed within 
the Roman Empire, so an eventual decline of the general culture of the earth 
could also introduce a much greater uglificat ion and in the end animalizat ion of 
man to the point of apelikeness. Precisely because we are able to visualize this 
prospect we are perhaps in a posit ion to prevent it  from occurring.80
But is this best ializat ion at the end of a civil izat ion really preventable or is this insight 
just the last spark of lucidity in a creature already condemned to senil ity and death? 
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